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Abstract
Service delivery protests against municipalities in South Africa have become common. This 
article discusses the relationship between party identification and these protests. It presents an 
in-depth analysis of two qualitative case studies: one in the Eastern Cape Province, where 
protests have mainly been about the shortage and poor quality of housing, and one in the 
Northern Cape, where protests were mainly aimed at getting the mayor to resign. A widely 
held view in the social movement literature is that the stronger the identification with the 
ruling party the less likely people are to protest, even when they have cause to do so. In South 
Africa, the connection between party affiliation and social movement is blurred. We found 
that partisan protesters were consequently able to navigate successfully between the party and 
concerned residents’ groups. There is a pressing need to consider what norms and values these 
protests will transmit to future generations.
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Résumé
Les manifestations de prestation de services contre les municipalités d’Afrique du Sud sont 
devenues courantes. Cet article traite de la relation entre l ’identification des partis et ces 
protestations. Il présente une analyse approfondie de deux études de cas qualitatives: une dans 
la province du Cap oriental, où les manifestations ont principalement porté sur la pénurie et 
la mauvaise qualité des logements, et une autre dans le Northern Cape, où les manifestations 
visaient principalement à obtenir le maire démissionner. Une opinion largement répandue 
dans la littérature sur le mouvement social est que plus l ’identification avec le parti au pouvoir 
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est forte, moins les gens sont susceptibles de protester, même quand ils ont des raisons de le faire. 
En Afrique du Sud, le lien entre l ’appartenance à un parti et le mouvement social est flou. Nous 
avons constaté que les manifestants partisans étaient en mesure de naviguer avec succès entre 
le parti et les groupes de résidents concernés. Il est urgent de réfléchir aux normes et aux valeurs 
que ces manifestations transmettront aux générations futures.
Mots clés: protestation de prestation de services, partisanerie, identité, action politique, 
Afrique du Sud
Introduction
Studies of South African civic life, both during and after apartheid, reveal a rich 
history of an active civil society (Von Holdt et al., 2011; Makino 2009; Marais et al., 
2008). From 1994, civil society organisations that had previously led protests against 
the apartheid government began to support – and even form alliances with – the ruling 
African National Congress (ANC) (Kabane 2011; Odendaal 2011). South Africa has 
witnessed, since then,’ a dramatic increase in the number of community protests, with 
some 14,740 being reported in 2015 (Mbeki 2016). In discussing recent service delivery 
protests, this paper reflects on the role of South Africa’s civil society in relation to national 
political institutions and their reciprocal roles in facilitating community development.
By ‘service delivery protests’ we mean collective action by a group of community 
members against a local municipality because of poor or inadequate provision of basic 
services, as well as a wider spectrum of concerns including government corruption, 
rampant crime and unemployment. The causes of the protests are varied and 
complex, ranging from systemic or structural factors to problems pertaining directly 
to governance (Matebesi & Botes 2011; Ngwane 2011). The protests may reflect the 
extent to which formal institutional channels for citizen engagement with the state have 
failed (Runciman 2014; Tapscott 2010), but conversely they may reflect the freedom 
of expression that South African citizens enjoy in the post-apartheid era (Bond 2010). 
What remains generally undisputed, though, is that the increasingly violent nature of 
the protests has weakened local government capacity and hindered basic service delivery.
International scholarly interest in protests has grown, and the upsurge in service 
delivery protests in South Africa has stimulated research (Alexander 2010; Karamoko 
& Jain 2010; Booysen 2009; Friedman 2006). Many of the studies are of single cases 
(Bernstein & Johnston 2007), focusing primarily on the frequency and nature of the 
protests (Karamoko & Jain 2010), or relying on media reports and ‘rapid response’ 
research designs (Alexander 2010). Taking a different slant, we explore the relationship 
between party identification – the extent to which one identifies with a political party – 
and service delivery protests. We base our discussion on two case studies involving South 
African local community groups, one an urban community from Port Elizabeth in the 
Eastern Cape, South Africa’s fifth largest metropole, and the other a rural community 
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from Olifantshoek, a small town in the Northern Cape. The studies were done between 
2007 and 2014, using an interpretive qualitative approach based on fieldwork consisting 
of in-depth interviews with representatives and members of the two community groups 
and purposively sampled councillors, community members, and a scan of all media 
reports about these protests (consisting of over 60 newspaper clippings). The two case 
studies could help to determine the extent to which Lowrance’s (2006: 167) claim that 
‘the closer one identifies with the state, the less likely one is to protest, even when 
significant grievances exist’ is applicable in South Africa.
In this paper we attempt to answer two questions: Does party identification in South 
Africa deter service delivery protests? and: Why do communities in South Africa 
mobilise against their local municipalities despite the availability of several democratic 
institutions? Note that in asking our first question we are looking specifically at the 
extent to which membership and support of the ruling ANC discourages people from 
embarking on service delivery protests or, contrary to the findings of the literature, 
encourages them to do so. We agree with the view widely held in the social movement 
literature that identity or identification – one’s cognitive, moral and emotional 
connection with an entity – is an important determinant of protest behaviour (Opp 
2009; Poletta & Jasper 2001; Melucci 1988). However, we disagree with the view that 
close identification with a political party makes one less likely to take part in protests, 
even when one has serious grievances (Lowrance 2006). If this view is correct, that makes 
it hard to find a plausible reason why many South African communities who support 
the ANC continue to protest against that same party. Our suggestion is that, given the 
current democratic deficit that exists in participatory governance structures in South 
Africa, communities see any push in the direction of further concentration of power in 
the hands of unresponsive office-bearers at local government level as dangerous.
Party identification perspectives and their application to South Africa
Here we explain the central assumptions of the theory of collective identity and 
consider how applicable they are to South Africa, which is currently experiencing the 
conflicted group identities and loyalties that are typical of communities grappling with 
strong undercurrents of instability. Studies of partisanship make important contributions 
to the literature on collective identity theory and consequently party identification. 
Partisanship, according to Lodge (2000: 98) ‘involves the factional exercise of rhetorical 
manipulation or raw power’. The term ‘partisanship’ is often incorrectly equated with 
‘party identification’. The latter is a narrower term, meaning a person’s self-identification 
with a political party. ‘Partisanship’ is a broader concept, involving developmental 
learning and intergenerational transmission, ‘including a complex transition to general 
consistency in an individual’s loyalty to a party, political preferences, and expectations’ 
(Smirnov et al. 2010). Party identification is more short-lived than partisanship: it 
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depends on one’s social and political experience, and party identification may not always 
converge with one’s core values, beliefs and preferences.
Collective identity theories provide a rich analytical foundation for the study of service 
delivery protests. Models of collective identity are diverse, representing attempts to capture 
different kinds of problems (Ostrom & Ahn 2009). There is, however, a degree of consensus 
that identity is one of the important social explanations for collective action (Opp 2009; 
Van Zomeren et al. 2008). Lowrance (2006: 168) defines identity as a ‘complex, evolving, 
multilayered, and situational relationship between an individual and a group or number of 
groups’. The concept became attractive to scholars in the quest to answer three questions: 
‘why collective actors come into being when they do’ (identity explains why interest tends 
to emerge); what motivates people to act (collective identity provides a more complete 
explanation of ‘the pleasures and obligations that actually persuade people to mobilise’ 
(Polleta & Jasper 2001: 284); and what the reasons are for a movement’s strategic choices 
(protest tactics are also influenced by collective identity) (Polleta & Jasper 2001).
Identity is not the only important determinant of protest behaviour. Other factors 
that make people mobilise, according to theories of collective action, are strong 
discontent, personal influence and social incentives (Olson 1965). Klandermans (2014) 
argues that identity (membership of a group), instrumentality (participating in political 
protest to change one’s circumstance), and ideology (views or beliefs) are the three 
fundamental reasons why people participate in political protests. It has also been found 
that participation in protests was particularly high when people had acquaintances who 
were critical of the state or had previously participated in protests (Tapscott 2010). 
According to Opp’s (2009) influential interpretation based on the works of several 
scholars, most definitions of collective identity or identification with a group refer to selective 
incentives. Those who identify with a group find it rewarding when they act in the interest of 
the group and costly when they do not. Opp (2009: 110) notes that ‘if somebody is strongly 
attached to a group, this means she or he is interested in the welfare of the group’. In another 
variant of this proposition, Polleta and Jasper (2001: 168) claim that: 
The key to ethnic protest is the identity that one holds. Those who 
identify as ‘Israeli’, that is, those Israeli Palestinians who identify 
with the Israeli state, are less likely to engage in system-challenging 
protest activity than those who do not, irrespective of the level of 
grievances held. 
In other words, identification with the state is an important stabilising factor and 
although grievances are an important motivator of any political action, their impact can 
be weakened by party identification. 
Historically, studies in long-standing democracies postulate that party identification 
is a dynamic psychological phenomenon that is influenced by short-term political forces. 
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These forces could spring from short-term evaluations of the parties, the president and 
the economy. In America, for example, individual-level party identification changes over 
time to ensure correspondence with views about the role the government should play in 
the economy and society of the country (Montgomery et al. 2015). In another example, 
Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2014) show how partisanship in Brazil is responsive to 
government performance in the short term. They attribute the wave of massive protests 
in Brazil in June 2013 to the decline in support for the governing Worker’s Party. This 
party’s affiliation decreased by 4% between May and July of the same year. In contrast, 
scandals, recessions, and landslide elections do not greatly affect party identification. 
Large shifts in party attachments occur only when a party’s social image changes, as 
for example when African Americans became part of the Democratic Party in the 
South after the Voting Rights Act was passed (Green et al. 2002). Similarly, while 
economic studies of voting have diverse findings, they tend to agree that the economy is 
a significant predictor of vote choice (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008).
In contrast to the view of protest politics as seditious radicalism, the surge in protest 
activity has also been linked to the normalisation of contentious politics in countries 
like Argentina and Bolivia. Adherents of this view claim that individuals who protest 
are generally strongly interested in politics and likely to engage in community activities, 
and that protest is a supplement to traditional forms of participation, such as elections. 
Interestingly, the difference in protests between Argentina and Bolivia has been ascribed 
to the degree to which actors within government (the governing political party, the MAS) 
and in Argentina by non-government actors (the piquetero movement and various trade 
unions) lead demonstrations in Bolivia (Moseley & Moreno 2010). Arce and Mangomet 
(2012) highlight the complex nature of movement of individuals between parties and 
social movements. They show that activists move between the two spaces to advance 
their goals, engaging in protest because they assume it will be instrumental in attaining 
a particular goal, but also because they find protest rewarding per se.
In studying partisan identity and protests in South Africa, we find no shortage of 
motivators, or what Lowrance (2006: 169) calls ‘lightning-rod issues’, for aberrations like 
service delivery protests. Faced with the reality that the state is generally unresponsive 
to demands raised through formal institutional channels, disaffected citizens and the 
organisations that represent them have increasingly sought alternative means to express 
their grievances. Pieterse (2003: 118) puts it plainly:
Organizations that act outside of constitutional and legal 
frameworks will continue to flourish and find community support 
as long as the government remains incapable of fulfilling crucial 
… functions. As long as the government remains deficient 
in capability and resources (exacerbated in a context of fiscal 
conservatism), alternative, informal and democratically ambiguous 
formations will emerge to fill the vacuum.
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The foregoing discussion explains much of the collective behaviour of South African 
citizens outside of politics. Why then do people who identify with the ruling ANC 
continue to participate in protests against the ANC government? One explanation 
offered by South African scholars is that it has to do with the dual nature of protests: 
factional struggles on the part of protest leaders to shift power within the local ANC, 
and the struggle of the masses to obtain socioeconomic rights (Twala 2014). However, 
dissatisfaction with service delivery and the way that important people in the ruling 
party reacted to protests about this may also have contributed to the factional struggles 
in the ANC. Furthermore, the ANC has a long history of anti-democratic conduct of 
its own internal affairs and in relation to South African society as a whole. And the 
party has been struggling to deal with the sources of the party’s structural decline, the 
erosion of trust in the party, recurrent internal party controversies, hostile intra-party 
leadership factions, internecine strife and countless corruption scandals (Hamil 2014). 
We contend that the decrease in electoral support for the ANC, which was most evident 
in Gauteng during the 2014 national elections (Greffrath & Duvenhage 2014), was 
largely a result of the ruling party ignoring the widespread call by numerous socio-
economic and political forces, including party members, to abandon e-tolls (electronic 
road tolling system) in the province (Motale 2015) An interesting finding from Table 
1 is that the ANC has lost more than 20% of its support in Nelson Mandela Bay (Port 
Elizabeth’s municipality) and this in just 10 years (from 2006 to 2016).
Table 1: General voter turnout and local government election results for ANC (%)
Municipality 2000 2006 2011 2016
Port Elizabeth 
(Nelson Mandela 
Bay)
Turnout Result Turnout Result Turnout Result Turnout Result
61.86 65.73 56.13 66.53 64.65 51.91 63.86 40.92
Olifantshoek 
(Gamagara)
54.31 64.34 47.95 69.24 54.62 63.45 57.18 48.68
Source: Compiled from various reports on local government and national and provincial 
election results (Electoral Commission of South Africa)
Although ANC electoral support has been decreasing since the country’s first national 
elections in 1994, those who identify closely with the party are more likely than the non-
affiliated to be primed by partisan considerations when evaluating party performance. 
Such partisans are normally more resistant to any negative information about the party 
(and the state, in the case of ruling parties). This sense of partisan identity was evident 
in the COSATU Workers’ Survey of 2008 (Buhlungu & Tshoaedi 2012), which showed 
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a general decline in satisfaction with service delivery among COSATU members. 
However, COSATU members, unlike other ANC supporters, remain generally 
reluctant to participate in service delivery protests because, among other things, of their 
‘continued faith in the ANC to deliver’ (Mosoetsa 2012: 163).
The cases and context
We chose the communities of Port Elizabeth and Olifantshoek and their struggles 
with their local municipalities for our empirical study. Port Elizabeth is part of the 
Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, South Africa’s fifth largest city, 
with an estimated population of over 1.5 million. It is the centre of the motor vehicle 
manufacturing industry in South Africa. The surrounding areas are heavily industrialised 
and intensively farmed. According to the 2011 Census data, the municipality has an 
unemployment rate of 36.6% and a dependency rate of 46% (Statistics South Africa 
2011). Olifantshoek, the second largest of the five towns that form part of the Gamagara 
Local Municipality, is largely a farming area. The iron ore mine at Sishen drives its 
development. Like most black and coloured residential areas in South Africa, the 
townships of Olifantshoek are under-serviced and residents are still living in abject 
poverty. Unemployment is high, with 46.9% of the population being unemployed and 
approximately 40% relying on social grants. This translates to a dependency rate of 
58.4% (Statistics South Africa 2011).
Figure 1: Map of case study areas
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Findings and discussion
In this section we consider three broad themes: the protestors’ identity, their main 
grievances, and their strategies and tactics.
Who are the protestors?
While partisanship implies a close relationship with one political party, partisans often 
have a multitude of relations with or connections to other external groups. A number of 
interviewees in Port Elizabeth confirmed that the main protagonists in the protests were 
members of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), including 
municipal officials. For example, a former councillor said ‘this whole fracas started as a 
result of the internal rift between the local ANC and its alliance partners, especially the 
SACP’, and also asserted that key Metro municipal officials, who were SACP members, 
had instigated the unrest while ostensibly working for the Council (interview, Former 
Councillor A, 18 April 2007). Another study also confirmed the role of the SACP 
in mobilising the community of Khutsong (Gauteng Province) to protests against the 
failed attempt to incorporate the area into another province (Matebesi & Botes 2011). 
Another interviewee, the Director of the Urban Services Group, regarded both 
ANC and SACP members as responsible for promoting the unrest agenda at the time 
(interview, 18 April 2007). Several councillors also asserted that the protests had been 
led by the ANC against itself – for example, one councillor said: ‘It started with us, the 
leaders. If we did not agree on certain issues at council or ANC meetings, some leaders 
would leave meetings to go and mobilise the community. The attitude and behaviour 
of some political leaders actually indicated that conflict [was] looming’ (interview, 
Councillor B, 19 April 2007). In the same vein, another councillor said that ‘certain 
ANC comrades’ had ‘influenced the public to resent other comrades’ and that the unrest 
was ‘primarily a manifestation of the nomination process of the local ANC branch’ 
particularly in the Kleinskool area (interview, Councillor C, 19 April 2007). Table 2 
gives an overview of the protests in Port Elizabeth. 
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Table 2: Summary of protests in Port Elizabeth, 2005–2015
Area Organisers Main grievances Duration
Kwadesi ANC members Poor municipal service delivery and lack of 
housing
1–16 May 2005
Kwazakhele ANC members Poor housing delivery 02 Feb 2012
Walmer ANC members Poor service delivery 12 Aug 2012
Walmer Walmer Steering 
Committee
Failure of Nelson Mandela Metro 
Municipality to fulfil promises to build RDP 
houses and improve road infrastructure
31 Oct 2012
Walmer Walmer Steering 
Committee
Lack of housing, electricity and proper 
sanitation
29–30 May 2012
Walmer ANC members Lack of housing, electricity and proper sanitation 2 July 2012
Missionvale Coloured 
community
Slow rate of housing delivery and other services 18 Oct 2013
Walmer Walmer Steering 
Committee
Lack of consultation on the removal of illegal 
electricity cables
15–16 May 2014
Joe Slovo and 
Kwadesi
Secretary of the 
Branch Executive 
Committee
Municipality giving away community’s sites to 
people from other areas
22 Sept 2014
Motherwell Community 
members
Eviction from illegally occupied newly built 
houses
19 June 2015
Walmer Walmer Steering 
Committee
Shortage of teachers at local schools 26 July 2015
Walmer Walmer Steering 
Committee
Unresolved matters between community and 
Nelson Mandela Metro Municipality on 
service delivery
12–13 Aug 2015
Motherwell Community 
members
Eviction from illegally occupied newly built 
houses
7 Nov 2015
Source: Authors’ compilation
Note: RDP houses are those built under the post-apartheid Reconstruction and 
Development Policy, now called the Housing Subsidy Programme (Venter et al. 
2015; Rust & Rubenstein 1996)
The Olifantshoek Concerned Residents (OCR) association was formed in 2009 by 
five active members of the local ANC Youth League (ANCYL). To emphasise the 
association’s allegiance to the ANC, one protest leader said its members had been raised 
within the ANC and had ‘always voted for it’ (interview, Chairperson of ANCYL 
and OCR Forum member, 01 March 2013). This illustrates the divided loyalties that 
characterise community protests in South Africa (Langa & Von Holdt 2012). For 
instance, another ANCYL member said, ‘Yes, we remain loyal to the organisation – in 
fact, we will vote again for the ANC in 2014 [with reference to the General Elections 
that took place in May 2014] – but we want to get rid of the rotten dogs within the 
party’ (interview, Member A of ANCYL and OCR Forum member, 01 March 2013). 
Table 3 shows the Olifantshoek protests.
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Table 3: Summary of protests in Olifantshoek
Area Organisers Main grievance Duration
Olifantshoek Local ANC members Service tariff increases by 
the local Council led by the 
Postmasburg-Olifantshoek 
Residents Association (Posra)
Feb–March 2001
Olifantshoek Disgruntled members of 
local ANC branch and ANC 
Youth League members
Corruption claims, and calls 
for the removal of the now late 
Mayor Maria Diniza
May–Sept 2012
Source: Nkosi (2012)
Studies in South Africa show the significance of civil society organisations in providing 
communities with a non-institutional space (Dawson & Sinwell 2012) or a fluid space 
(Langa & Von Holdt 2012) outside of the state. This enables activists to move regularly 
back and forth between institutional (or party) and non-institutional spaces to air their 
collective grievances (Steyn 2012).
The protestors’ main grievances: evidence of factionalism within the 
ANC
The most common grievances mentioned by the protestors in Port Elizabeth and 
Olifantshoek were the poor quality of basic services such as water and electricity provision 
and the shortage of housing. During nine years of sporadic outbreaks of service delivery 
protests in Port Elizabeth (2005–2014), failure to provide houses has been the most 
pervasive grievance (SABC, 2014; SAPA 2012; Matyu 2005). At the time of our 2007 
interviews, the municipality accused the province of excessive bureaucratisation and 
failing to release allocated housing subsidies timeously. In turn, the provincial leaders 
berated the municipality for its limited capacity for sustained delivery of good quality 
housing (Matavire 2005). The former Mayor’s views on the problem were insightful:
In respect of the housing problem, the Provincial Government communicated only 
with the local Department of Housing on issues related to housing. Not all politicians are 
informed about the complex issues around the allocation and building of houses… The 
Provincial Government is much to blame for this. For example, they will only inform us 
at a very late stage that we should take note of new amendments and directives made in 
the allocation of housing subsidies, which are in contrast to what we have been sharing 
over months with the local community. Unfortunately, people on the ground do not 
understand these complex issues. How do you go back to people and say, ‘Sorry, all the 
information that we have been sharing with you for the past six months has changed’? 
(Interview, former Mayor of Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 2 May 2007)
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The grounds for the protests in Olifantshoek were laid in 2009 when the OCR 
complained about local ANC members being exploited by ANC leaders for personal 
gain during elections and about alleged corruption in a community development trust. 
The protest about the trust was led by the chairperson of the local ANC branch. Going 
beyond these original concerns, the OCR’s central grievance in 2012 was about the 
Mayor of Gamagara Municipality, whose resignation it demanded. The Mayor was 
accused of displaying disrespect for the community, and making empty promises about 
jobs, bursaries and infrastructural projects (focus group discussion with OCR leaders, 
01 March 2013). 
The final precipitating factor that led to violent protests and the closing down of 
schools for more than eight months in 2012 was the request to OCR leaders to provide 
evidence to corroborate the allegations they had made (Public Protector of South Africa 
2012). In a turn of events that would become a sad episode in the history of protest 
behaviour in South Africa, the community forcibly shut down schools in Olifantshoek. 
The same protest tactic of closing schools would later be used in several areas in the 
Northern Cape, resulting in the closure of over 60 schools and affecting more than 
16,000 learners (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2012).
Our argument is that in addition to the ‘genuine concerns’ about basic services, 
another, hidden, factor fuelled the protests in both cases: factional fights within the 
local ANC. Several scholars have convincingly shown how factions that lose out on 
leadership positions and local business opportunities (and thus power and money) use 
service delivery protests as a means to settle scores (Langa & Von Holdt 2012). A Port 
Elizabeth resident, for example, said that ‘some councillors are perceived to be “anti-
development” and tend not to be supportive of any local development project that they 
are not directly involved in’ (interview, Councillor B, 9 April 2007). In this regard, a 
councillor in Port Elizabeth said: 
Other factors apart from the perceived lack of service provision also 
contributed to the unrest. Mainly disenchanted ANC members 
who were not on the nomination lists mobilised the community. 
They were frustrated because they were positioning themselves for 
the forthcoming elections. (Interview, Councillor C, 9 April 2007)
A further analysis of the factors that fuelled the protest points to lack of transparency 
in internal party processes. For example, when the OCR leaders were asked why they 
had targeted the Mayor, they responded that she was the head of administration and 
therefore had to take responsibility for the municipality’s failure to deliver services. She 
was also accused of using the municipality and the mines to settle internal ANC party 
disagreements, repressing dissent, side-lining outspoken residents and rewarding those 
who were close to her (interview with community member, 01 March 2013). Amid calls 
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for her resignation, the Mayor insisted that she had been ‘appointed by the ANC’ and 
would not resign ‘unless asked to do so by the party’ (NoordKaap Gazette 2013).
The foregoing accounts must be understood against the background of a state 
confronted with the latent and embedded political and historical pressures of apartheid, 
and a citizenry who believe they are entitled to demand better services from the 
government. Forums and mechanisms of political representation and accountability in 
South Africa have proliferated, but their effectiveness and inclusiveness have lagged 
behind (Matebesi & Botes 2011). Communities are therefore challenging the existing, 
legally enforced power balance between citizens and the state (Runciman 2014). In 
this regard, Von Holdt (2013) argues that while the new economic and political elites 
have grown stronger and stronger, citizens have been increasingly marginalized, and the 
protests are the manifestation of communities’ real grievances and of ANC members’ 
infighting to secure lucrative positions and tenders. Our study’s findings largely 
supported the grievances as a cause of the protests and to a lesser extent the infighting. 
The protestors’ strategies and tactics
We analysed the strategies and tactics the protesters used to sustain mobilisation 
against local municipalities. Scholars have described partisan activists’ ability to move 
between the party and civil society organisations (Moseley & Moreno 2010). We found 
a paper trail of evidence in both our case studies showing that the protestors had tried 
on several occasions to engage their local municipality. We found evidence that the more 
traditional forms of protest followed such attempts: holding public meetings, mounting 
demonstrations, presenting petitions, and so on. The protest leaders’ mobilisation 
strategies were centred on scapegoating. A councillor in Port Elizabeth said: ‘Some 
of my colleagues and municipal officials were quick to run and share sensitive council 
information with other members of the ANC or community leaders.’ Similarly, an OCR 
leader described how their complaints about the mayor were ignored: ‘There is one 
public tap for about 300 people and one toilet shared by five families. But the brother of 
the mayor has a tap in his yard. [Would] this not anger you?’
By blaming their grievances on an intransigent and unresponsive local municipal 
system, rather than on party political infighting, protest leaders were able to undermine 
the efforts of local municipal and political leaders to respond to the residents’ initial 
demands. This tactic has enabled protest leaders throughout South Africa to mobilise 
and sustain their protests against local municipalities. According to DeNardo (1985), 
groups may use both intimidation and violence to multiply the disruptive capacity 
of activists. This perhaps explains why the sporadic service delivery protests in Port 
Elizabeth since 2005 have been marred by violence. 
In Olifantshoek, most interviewees said they supported peaceful protests, but were against 
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the closure of schools and the destruction of private property and public facilities. The 
residents claimed there were high levels of intimidation: anyone who spoke out against the 
closure of the schools ran the risk of having their house torched (interview with community 
member, Olifantshoek, 01 March 2013) An unfortunate consequence of all this was that 
most matriculants and other pupils were forced to repeat their grades in 2013, when schools 
reopened after the intervention of the Public Protector (City Press 2012). The protest leaders 
also change tactics as they deem necessary. The Chairperson of the OCR said:
We never planned any violent strategy, but we were led by decisions 
taken by the community. The public spaces of dialogue were 
failing us and we had no choice but to implement the suggestions 
made by the community. In the absence of strong legitimate 
and functional participatory structures, communities in South 
Africa will continue to use violence. This is the only language our 
government understands. (Interview, 1 March 2013)
Further comments can be made about the strategies of partisan protest activists. 
First, it is evident that partisan activists exploit the sporadic and fragmented nature 
of community forums by both engaging and eschewing partisanship. They accomplish 
this through successful movement between the party and the noninstitutionalised 
space created by protestors. Chen and Goren (2014: 5) note that party identification 
acts like a ‘running tally’ whereby citizens ‘adjust their partisan attachments to ensure 
correspondence with their stands on political issues’. Thus partisan activists can have 
agency by engaging in the realms of both the party and the community forums.
Second, the Olifantshoek case serves as a prime example of patronage politics. 
Patronage and contentious collective action (such as service delivery protests) are 
distinct strategies that sometimes overlap to address grievances and resolve problems 
(Auyero et al. 2009). The OCR leaders first adopted intimidation and violence as their 
strategies, but swiftly changed tack or refused to accept responsibility when asked why 
they were using schools as bargaining power. 
Third, the Port Elizabeth case reveals another side to partisan protest leaders: their 
underhand tactical operations. While OCR leaders were open about their involvement 
in the protests, and at one stage lived on a farm on the outskirts of Olifantshoek 
in compliance with their bail conditions, community members in Port Elizabeth 
complained that some protest leaders would mobilise the community through meetings, 
but would ‘never show up during the day of protests’ (interview, Community member 
B, 18 April 2007). In arranging these meetings, the activists’ mobilisation tactic was to 
publicly express the collective grievances of the community and thus attract attention. 
Hodder (2014: 12) describes such tactics as ‘instrumental, personalistic, and self-centred 
behaviour’. This supports Smirnov et al.’s view (2010) that people faced with a social 
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dilemma may engage in partisan activity because it offers benefits that compensate for 
the costs of participation. In the case of the no-shows, the aim was to avoid exposure of 
their involvement in the protests, for fear of victimisation.
Conclusions
The cases of Olifantshoek and Port Elizabeth shed light on the way partisan protest 
activists move between the party and the community. The findings enhance our 
knowledge of the fluid space occupied by partisan activists and help us understand the 
strategies that service delivery protesters use in South Africa. Our study offers three 
important insights.
First, the conventional view sees social movements as distinct from and in contrast to 
the party. It is not surprising, then, that the central proposition of studies on identity is 
that people who identify with a party are loyal to it. This would mean that people who 
identify with the ANC would be less likely to engage in service delivery protests. But 
we found that, far from this being the case, it was ANC members who led the service 
delivery protests in our two cases. However, this finding should be approached with 
caution since the social identities of a party member and a member of a civil society 
organisation are often intertwined and inseparable from each other in South Africa.
Second, while the distinction between the party and non-institutionalised tactics such 
as protests is useful for analysing how social movements often make demands on the 
state, it is less useful for understanding the ways activists work both inside and outside 
the party realms to promote civil society organisations’ goals. Our study shows that the 
struggle for political power and thus for the control of the party authority structures first 
proceeds through party internal structures. And if unresolved, these party struggles are 
likely to become more intense and hostile (Tyoden 2013). This view is consistent with 
the instrumentalist view that partisanship drives collective action among those who are 
motivated to defend their own interests, ideology and issues. 
Third, previous research has shown how partisan activists may exacerbate peoples’ 
discontent in order to stimulate higher levels of participation in the protests. And, as 
this study showed, since political parties are clearly stronger and more influential than 
individual partisan activists, these activists sometimes operate covertly to reduce exposure 
and thus survive in patronage networks. The fundamental struggle of partisan activists is 
not only about communities’ grievances but also for recognition and legitimacy. 
Generally, the study showed the usefulness of protest politics as a legitimate means 
of political expression, but also that the interaction between local municipalities and 
communities is critical for managing strained relations. For example, the trauma 
that parents and children suffered because of the intimidation involved in the school 
closures in Olifantshoek must not be understated. The children suffer the most. A 
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recent UNICEF report found that children in such situations are at risk of truancy and 
repeating grades and tend to have lower educational aspirations and achievement levels 
than children who have not been exposed to violence. And there may also be long-term 
economic consequences, such as increased rates of unemployment in adulthood and a 
greater likelihood of living below the poverty line (UNICEF 2014).
Exposure to violence in childhood can lead to aggression, social withdrawal and 
difficulty in relating to others. Future behavioural problems may include an increased risk 
of perpetrating violence against others, including physical fights with peers, dating violence 
and bullying (Vagi et al., 2013). There are crucial questions to be asked: Irrespective of the 
extent to which communities identify with the state, does the perceived poor quality of 
service delivery warrant the burning of public facilities and the closure of schools? Are 
these the norms and values that South Africa wants to instil in future generations?
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